Abstract-Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) attempts to find cryptographic protocols resistant to attacks using Shor's polynomial time algorithm for numerical field problems or Grover's search algorithm. A mostly overlooked but valuable line of solutions is provided by non-commutative algebraic structures, specifically canonical protocols that rely on one-way trapdoor functions (OWTF). Here we develop an algebraic framework who could be applied to different asymmetric protocols like D-H KE (Diffie-Hellman key exchange), Public Key Encryption, Digital Signature, ZKP (zero-knowledge proof) authentication, Oblivious Transfer, Multi-Party Computing, and so on. The trapdoor one-way functions selected are (a) Triple decomposition Problem (TDP) developed by Kurt, where a known element is factored into a product of three unknown factors and (b) a new version of conjugacy search that we refer from now on as Blind Conjugacy Search Problem (BCSP). Our platform structure is the general linear group ( , ) d-square non-singular matrices of prime field values. In our case, we use p=251 (the biggest prime fitting into a byte) and d=8. We give support to the fact that this framework is cryptographically secure against classical attacks like linear algebra attacks, length-based attacks, side-channel attacks against square (or duplicate) and multiply (or sum) algorithm, high sensitivity to pseudo random deterministic generators, etc. At same time it is immune against quantum attacks (using Grover and Shor), if the size parameters are carefully selected. Also, there is no pattern emerging from the intermediate computations, and therefore resulting tokens or encrypted information is indistinguishable from same size random matrices. This feature is a key point to assign semantic security to the framework and a way to obtain IND-CCA2 security. An additional advantage is that all operations fit into byte modular arithmetic's.
INTRODUCTION
ost-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is a trend that has an official NIST status [1, 2] and which aims to be resistant to quantum computers attacks like Shor [3] and Grover [4] algorithms. NIST initiated last year a process to solicit, evaluate, and standardize one or more quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms [1] . Particularly Shor algorithm provided a quantum way to break asymmetric protocols.
Security of a canonical non-commutative protocol always relies his security on a one-way trapdoor function (OWTF) [5] . For instance, in an algebraic context, the conjugacy search problem, decomposition problem, double coset problem, triple decomposition problem, factorization search problem, commutator based or simultaneous conjugacy search problem. All are hard problems assumed to belong to AWPP timecomplexity (but out of BQP) [6] which yield convenient computational security against current quantum attacks.
More information about post-quantum cryptography (PQC), non-commutative cryptography (NCC) and non-associative cryptography (NAC) could be found in published works [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] .
THE PLATFORM GROUP: ( , )
The algebraic platform uses the general linear group, nonsingular modular matrices of d-dimension.
Let , and of those p d^2-d are nilpotent [14] . The number of elements in the general linear group of d-order non-singular square matrices is:
A non-singular matrix or d-order whose monic characteristic polynomial is irreducible in Fp, generates a cyclic (thus commutative) subgroup Pd of = , . Each d-degree irreducible polynomial f(x) in Fp [x] field has a square companion matrix of d-order who acts as a generator of the multiplicative cyclic subgroup Pd, and each member of this subgroup corresponds to a unique monic characteristic polynomial of at most d-1 degree [14] . The number of nontrivial (null or unitary) monic d-degree f(x) over F251 field is:
Using Möbius " function, the Np(d) number of monic irreducible d-degree polynomials over Fp [x] field is:
To generate a random d-order monic irreducible polynomial over Fp [x] , we use the probabilistic Algorithm 4.70 [15] Using an irreducible polynomial in an extension field is a method of generating a Pd commutative subgroup of the nonsingular modular square matrices, but there exists another way to achieve the same goal. For matrices, the necessary and sufficient condition for two symmetric (diagonalizable) matrices to commute, is that they share the same orthonormal basis, that means the same eigenvectors P matrix [16] . If we start from two different diagonal matrices with strictly positive eigenvalues D1, D2; then the transformed A =P -1 D1 P and B = P -1 D2 P commute. The later approach is computational much faster than the first one, so it is followed in our framework.
For the p=251, d=8 example, the involved cardinals are depicted at Table I . The Yesem Kurt TDP protocol is fully described in [17] . We use the Protocol I there described as we found it better fitted to our platform. From this problem we derive a stronger one, the computational Blind Conjugacy Search Problem (BCSP) as follows:
Computational BCSP: Given G, a non-abelian group with solvable word problem and given any element a e G, and an unknown element b e G, find at least one element x e G such that a = x -1 b x.
The additional challenge here is to find a conjugator ignoring the conjugated element. Any time two entities share a common key element of a group, if that key is used as a conjugator, it can be used to hide (or encrypt) any other conjugated element. In our TDP based framework, we use the shared key as conjugator for any matrix encoded plain text.
STEP-BY-STEP DESCRIPTION
We present a combined D-H and BCSP cipher protocol, the only difference between both lies at the last step added.
In our version, we work with two entities (Alice and Bob), but this could be easily generalized for any number of participants. All arithmetic operations should be assumed belonging to field (6 .   TABLE II  SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS.   TABLE III  PUBLIC SETUP STEPS   TABLE IV  PRIVATE PROCEDURES   TABLE V  PRIVATE KEYS   TABLE VI  PUBLIC KEYS   TABLE VII  COMMON D-H SESSION KEY   TABLE VIII  ADDITIONAL ENCRYPTION STEP (BCSP PROTECTED) It is easy to apply the same framework to other asymmetric protocols. For example, defining power-sets of matrices, a straightforward ElGamal solution is at hand. Also, extending the GL() to a polynomial ring, a Maze et al. protocol could be implemented [8] . Changing of purpose, a ZKP authentication protocol, a Baumslag et al. KEM (key encapsulation mechanism) or a Digital Signature is almost trivial to design [9] . When powers of matrices are used new kind of weakness could appear, the multiplicative order of the elements should be sufficiently high to foil brute-force attacks. One could use companion matrices of primitive polynomials as generators of high order subgroups. Comparing different canonical approaches, the BCSP application of this framework offer a reasonable compromise solution between cryptographic security and fast computation.
At APPENDIX I we present a standard Mathematica source code and the running results (on a Core i5 PC/2.20GHz). No attempt was made to optimize that code and computations are only included as a proof of concept. All symbols included there, follow here explained conventions.
FRAMEWORK SECURITY
Some required properties that the algebraic platform (G) should have in order to have an efficient and secure framework [8, 17] , could be resumed here: 
Generating private elements
ALICE BOB Private keys
ALICE BOB Public keys (tokens)
Private session key (K) obtained 
G should be non-abelian and of exponential growth as function of the length of its elements. In our framework, G is the general linear group and the A, B subgroups cardinality growth exponentially as the d-dimension parameter increases linearly. II.
The word problem (determining if an element is or not an identity) should be efficiently solved. That achieves trivially the matrix framework. III.
Elements of G should be efficiently represented on a computer. This is also trivial in our case. IV.
Multiplication and inversion of elements should be computationally easy within the representation. Again, the proposed framework complies it. V.
If centralizers of generator sets are used, it should be hard to solve a decomposition problem presented in [17] . In our case, we do not require them.
As shown, our framework fits well into the required settings.
A way to attack the present protocol would be to find a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm to solve the algebraic triple decomposition problem and the blind conjugacy search problem.
To guarantee that TDP truly rely on non-linear triple decomposition, the framework should avoid some pitfalls. One way to attack TDP is to find a pseudo-key that works as a private one of any entity [17] , which requires solving:
Specifically, equation (5) is quadratic in terms of three unknowns and this foils linear algebraic attacks. There should be paid attention to some cases to be avoided. We resume them here. (6) should have many solutions. (e) In case of the use of generators to define the subgroups in the setting, they should be short to foil a length-based attack.
More details of these considerations could be found at Kurt's paper [17] and Myasnikov et al. book [8] . In our framework:
(a) Large cardinality of involved sets could be obtained selecting appropriate dimensional parameters. (b) Commutativity restrictions are accurately followed as each eigenvector matrix are independent of others.
(c) Equation (6) has a very big number of solutions (see eq. (7) 
For a real-life application, we suggest to use at least P8 or perhaps expanding the commutative subgroup to P16, who implies a 510-bit level classical security. The corresponding quantum security level is the respective square roots of the key space cardinals [7] . The obvious drawback is the corresponding increase in space, each matrix in {P8, P16} occupies respectively {512, 2048} bits. A corresponding computational session time should be expected.
Against quantum-based attacks, the dimensional increase foils Grover like attacks and no multiplicative (or additive) cyclic order finding adaptation of Shor's algorithm is known and accessible against the present protocol.
As a final consequence, we infer that our proposed framework could be gotten immune against brute-force attacks, linear representation attacks, length-based attacks and currently known quantum attacks.
SEMANTIC SECURITY
The key point to assure semantic security is the indistinguishability of encrypted information from random one of same length [5, 18, 19, 20] .
The presented framework is easily translatable to other asymmetric protocols. For this reason, the following security analysis is not limited to the present example and can be extended in new contexts. To proceed with this analysis, two conjectures are exposed.
DEFINITION (D1): interactive challenge-response game by a verifier against an active adversary.
In this three-phase protocol, two entities, an adversary and a verifier (or challenger) are involved. The verifier has a secret key that he tries to hide from the adversary and allows the adversary to pose questions to him that answers truthfully like an Oracle. In a first phase, the adversary can raise all the questions that he wants to try to obtain information about the secret key. In a second phase, the verifier presents the secret key (k) to the adversary next to another of equal length and format (* k) randomly generated. Even during the second phase, the adversary may continue to consult the verifier, except for questions linked to the disclosure of the secret itself. In the third phase, the adversary has a polynomial time stochastic algorithm and must distinguish whether the secret is k or * k, with probability negligibly greater than ½. If the opponent achieves the distinction with that probability, he wins the game and loses it in the opposite case.
CONJECTURE (C1): Indistinguishability of product transformed random matrices.
The elements of ( , ) are uniformly random integers of prime modulus and d-dimension. It is a known fact that sum or multiplication between random field integers, does not introduce statistical bias into results [21] . Therefore, linear transformed matrices are statistically distributed as any random generated ones. The consequence is that in an interactive challenge-response protocol (Definition D1), an adversary does not achieve the distinction raised with the required probability.
CONJECTURE (C2): the present framework adheres to semantic security under IND-CCA2.
The TDP one-way trapdoor function with which the private key is protected is, as previous exposed, not weakened by attacks of probabilistically polynomial time, whether classical or quantum that are in the public domain until today, forcing the potential attacker to perform a systematic exploration of the private key space (the diagonal matrices). Under this assumption and considering the indistinguishability of randomly generated matrices and enciphered ones, it is reasonable to assign to the framework a security mark equivalent to IND-CCA2 (semantic security under IND-CCA2) [19, 20] .
PREVIOUS WORK
Some previous work over the same issue was conducted by the author along last year's [22, 23, 24] . Recently we contributed to NIST standardization Program with a Maze et al. protocol where the selected platform was based in octonions algebra [25] . Unfortunately, it was a bad choice because an algebraic attack of Bernstein [26] exposed the octonion's weakness. This shows that even a viable OWTF does not cover against a weak platform. Statements like the exposed in 6. Framework Security (I. to V.) should be faithfully pursued to achieve an efficient asymmetric cryptographic system.
CONCLUSIONS
We developed a non-arbitrated algebraic post-quantum framework of canonical non-commutative cryptography, which could easily be adapted to any other asymmetric purpose.
Security and computational efficiency were the main concerns at developing time. Therefore, TDP was selected as an appropriate OWTF for D-H Key Exchange between two entities. Once obtained, the common key is used to cipher messages between both using a simple transformation protected by BCSP, a blind conjugacy problem OWTF.
Classical and quantum attacks are discussed, and the framework seems to be resilient to both. Also, evidence to assign semantic security (IND-CCA2) to the framework is provided. Nevertheless, it must be kept attention to any appearing cryptanalytic tools against non-commutative platforms [27] .
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